Promoter structures library
Micro-Captive Insurance
Sold as: "captive insurance", "your own insurance company", "831(b) plan", "enterprise risk captive", "risk retention program", "self-insurance for the risks nobody will write"
Technical name: Small nonlife insurance company electing under IRC Sec. 831(b) to be taxed only on investment income
A captive is an insurance company. If it never pays a claim, never underwrites a risk, and its premiums were set by asking you how much you wanted to deduct, it is not an insurance company, and two courts of appeals have now said so.
Classification B. Real tax law with a real benefit. Promoters break it.
The pitch
Deduct up to the annual Sec. 831(b) ceiling (2,850,000 dollars for 2025) of premiums at the operating company under Sec. 162, receive them tax-free at the captive under Sec. 831(b), and later extract at qualified dividend or capital gain rates. Asset protection and estate freeze thrown in.
Where it breaks
The arrangement must be insurance under Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941): risk shifting, risk distribution, insurable risk, and insurance in the commonly accepted sense. Promoter captives fail on actuarially unsupported premiums reverse-engineered to the ceiling, circular flows of funds, sham risk pools, no claims ever paid, the insured simultaneously carrying full commercial coverage, and no genuine underwriting.
What it costs you if it is wrong
The premium deduction goes away. In Patel the court sustained 40 percent penalties under Sec. 6662(i) for the nondisclosed years and 20 percent for the disclosed one, and because the case turned on Sec. 7701(o), Sec. 6664(c)(2) switches the reasonable cause defense off entirely. Form 8886 is separate: Sec. 6707A reaches a failure to file it whether or not the deduction is ultimately sustained.
Red flags specific to this structure
- The manager also owns the risk pool
- The actuary asks how much you want to deduct
- No claims in five years
- The pitch leads with the deduction rather than the risk
Questions to ask the person selling this
Take these into the next meeting. Someone selling the legitimate version answers them without difficulty.
- 1Who owns the risk pool, and are you or your firm affiliated with it?
- 2Show me the actuarial report. What loss data set the premium?
- 3How many claims has this program paid in the last five years, and what is the loss ratio?
- 4Which of the Rev. Rul. 2002-89, 2002-90, or 2002-91 safe harbors does this satisfy?
- 5Will Form 8886 be filed, and who prepares it?
- 6Who wrote the tax opinion, and are they paid by the captive manager?
Which of the Seven Markers this trips
The promoter selects the appraiser or the actuary
The economics do not work without the tax benefit
'The IRS has never listed this'
The legitimate version
A real captive insuring real, identifiable, otherwise-uninsured or under-insured risk with a genuine business need.
What distinguishes it
- Premiums set by an independent actuary from loss data, not reverse-engineered to the ceiling
- Risk distribution satisfied under the Rev. Rul. 2002-89/90/91 safe harbors
- Claims are actually submitted and paid; the loss ratio behaves like insurance
- Adequate capitalization, real reserves, licensed domicile, arm's-length policies
- No circular loanbacks to the owner
- Commercial coverage is replaced or supplemented rationally, not duplicated
- PATH Act diversification requirement met
- Form 8886 filed for TOI status
- Independent tax opinion from counsel not affiliated with the captive manager
What the courts have done
How this has actually gone for the people who bought one.
The case that teaches it
- name
Patel v. Commissioner, 165 T.C. No. 10 (Nov. 12, 2025)
- facts
Texas physician paid roughly 4,500,000 dollars in premiums to two captives while carrying only 68,000 to 106,000 dollars of genuine commercial coverage. The actuary set premiums to the amount the taxpayer wanted, not to risk.
- holding
Failure of BOTH prongs of the economic substance test. Sustained 40% penalties under Sec. 6662(i) for 2014-2015 as nondisclosed noneconomic substance transactions, 20% for 2016. Reliance on the parties who structured the captive was unreasonable because they profited from structuring it.
- why it teaches
Decided on Sec. 7701(o), entirely independent of reportability. Promoters are spinning the Drake Plastics vacatur as vindication. It is not. Vacating a disclosure rule does not make the deduction good.
Enforcement
IR-2025-68, June 16, 2025: Bruce Molnar, cofounder of Alta Holdings LLC, agreed to pay IRC Sec. 6700 penalties for a program sold 2005-2012 following Syzygy. The IRS did not publish the dollar amount. Active LB&I compliance campaign, lead Lisa Rupert.
Reporting status
Transaction of interest under Reg. 1.6011-11 (loss ratio under 60% OR a financing factor, disjunctive). The listed-transaction reg 1.6011-10 was vacated in April 2026 but the district courts are split and it is on appeal. Both categories use the same Form 8886, so a captive that was listed almost certainly still reports as a TOI. Reporting is not eliminated; only the penalty tier and Sec. 6662A exposure shift.
Typical fees
Formation 50,000 to 75,000 dollars. Annual management, actuarial, and domicile fees commonly 25,000 to 100,000 dollars or more. Fee data is largely promoter-disclosed; treat as directional.
Holding one of these, or being pitched one?
The diagnostic work is worth doing before the return gets filed rather than after. That is a conversation, not an engagement.
Schedule a complimentary consultationTake this into the meeting: the one-page brief
Statutes, regulations, and rulingsthe authority behind everything above
Authority
- statute
- IRC Sec. 831(b)
- IRC Sec. 162
- IRC Sec. 7701(o)
- cases irs won
- Avrahami v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. 144 (2017)
- Reserve Mechanical Corp. v. Commissioner, 34 F.4th 881 (10th Cir. 2022)
- Syzygy Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-34
- Caylor Land & Dev. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2021-30
- Swift v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-13, aff'd 5th Cir. 2025
- Patel v. Commissioner, 165 T.C. No. 10 (Nov. 12, 2025)
- safe harbors for the legitimate version
- Rev. Rul. 2002-89 (50 percent or more unrelated premium)
- Rev. Rul. 2002-90 (12 or more operating subsidiaries, none over 15 percent)
- Rev. Rul. 2002-91 (group captives)
- Rev. Rul. 2005-40 (single insured and disregarded entities fail)